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EDITORIAL
BLENDING OF DELUSIONS IN RUSSIA RATIONALIZING ITS WAR TO ANNEX
UKRAINE

While it is obvious that Russia’s motives for the unprovoked brutal war against Ukraine are
complex, what is not quickly apparent is the incendiary intermingling of a collective delusion of
persecution and the delusion of grandeur of an individual.
Delusion of Persecution
After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the Russian Federation remains the geographically
largest country in the world. Ethnic Russians were both during Imperial Russia as well as the
Bolshevik Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the core of this vast country, so much so that in
common parlance most people simply referred to it as Russia and the people as Russians, whatever
their ethnicity. The Russian language was dominant and at times the required means of
communication. In all parts of that enormous Eurasian landmass, ethnic Russians were both a
significant and influential presence.
Those of us who have frequently visited the country quickly observed that tourist guides, lecturers,
and common people more often talked about the invasions of Russia by hostile enemies than of
Russian expansion and military ventures against other countries over the centuries. The most
frequent reference are the times of the “Mongol yoke” or “Tatar-Mongol Yoke” (13th-15th
centuries). On some of these travels the references to this time “of yoke” were so numerous that
we could anticipate when and how it would be told; it became somewhat of a joke. Whether the
narratives about these times are true or fictitious is debated among historians but clearly it has left
a traumatic memory among Russians.
Another impactful invasion was that of Napoleon in 1812, lasting about six months,
penetrating all the way to Moscow. The Russians mostly avoided direct battles (except the battle
at Borodino), correctly anticipating that the harsh weather and the lack of supplies would force
Napoleon to retreat, proving that he was not invincible.
There were other invasions such as by the Teutonic Knights, Crimean-Turkish forces,
Sweden, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Hapsburg Empire, and Japan. More
memorable were the battles of World War I after Imperial Russia collapsed in 1918, forcing the
Bolsheviks to cede Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states to Germany.
By far the most traumatic was the invasion by Nazi Germany and the Axis powers during
World War II, where the Soviet Union suffered enormous human losses (estimated at over 25
million Soviet citizens) and, at first, significant territorial losses. The Red Army finally pushed
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out all the invaders in 1944, contributing along with Western Allies to the total surrender of
Germany in May 1945.
Clearly the Russian people suffered much over the centuries from foreign countries that
had designs on their territories, and these experiences left a deep imprint on the Russian psyche.
But these were not all of Russian involvements in wars. While we shall not endeavor to enumerate
all of Russia’s foreign military actions, it suffices to point out that neither Kievan Rus’ nor the
Principality of Muscovy were large at first; quite small when compared to Russia’s later maximal
territories. Nearly all these territorial gains were the result of wars against their neighbors.
There were nearly five centuries of on and off Russian wars against the Byzantine Empire,
Bulgaria, Ottoman Turkish Empire, Sweden, Lithuania, Poland, Tatarstan, Astrakhan, conquest
of Siberia, Persia, Kazakhstan, Austria, Finland, France (Russian troops entered Paris), Caucasian
wars, conquest of Central Asia, crushing of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, wars in China,
Russo-Japanese wars, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Georgia, Mongolia, two occupations of
Afghanistan, several partitions of Poland, occupation of Karelia, Bessarabia, and Bukovina,
crushing of the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 and Czechoslovak Spring in 1968, war in Moldova
(Transnistria), Abkhazia, Chechnya, and current intervention in civil wars in Syria and Central
Africa. This is an incomplete list, the point being that over the centuries the Russians engaged in
many more wars of conquest than in defensive wars.
So how come the Russians fear being conquered without being equally aware of their
distant and recent expansionism? The discrepancy between the numbers of invasions of Russian
territory and the number of military conquests of other countries is so great that one may correctly
conclude that Russians suffer from an unrealistic perception of reality, namely a delusion of
persecution. Their traumas of having been invaded do not allow them to feel secure in the size of
their country, their status of a great power, and the possession of an enormous conventional and
nuclear arsenal and the means to deliver it no matter how far from their own country.
Vladimir Putin and his inner circle are aware of this delusion, and might even experience
it themselves; however, they are deliberately exploiting it for their imperial ambitions. They are
convincing the Russian people that the Russian Federation needs a cordon sanitaire—the way the
USSR enhanced its security by creating the Warsaw Pact. Putin is demanding that the neighboring
countries must be either part of Russia or at least militarily neutral. That is why Finland’s and
Sweden’s accession to NATO frightens Russian leadership. And that is why nearly all neighbors
of the Russian Federation feel especially threatened since February 2022. It also explains why all
former members of the Warsaw Pact rather quickly joined NATO. Seeing Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, they feel glad they did so—even tiny Montenegro, traditionally very pro-Russian,
calculated that it is in their interest to be a member of NATO.
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Delusion of Grandeur
The current President of the Russian Federation is an unusually ambitious man who has set
out to correct what he perceives as the “greatest geo-political catastrophe of the twentieth century,”
namely the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. That in itself is a very unrealistic appraisal, knowing that
the twentieth century witnessed two world wars with unprecedented numbers of casualties, the
Bolshevik Revolutions, Stalin’s mega genocides, the Holocaust, Mao’s Communist Revolution,
the tumultuous dissolution of colonial empires, and numerous other genocides. Very methodically
Putin is reversing and undoing almost all of the reforms undertaken by Mikhail Gorbachev, whom
he blames for allowing the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and seems to despise Gorbachev so
much that he is unwilling to even attend his funeral.
Putin publicly displays an exhibitionist trait of super-masculinity, such as horseback riding
bare-chested, playing ice hockey with professionals, cuddling a jaguar, fishing and hunting, and
other symbols of aggressive masculinity, which has been satirized by Western media, but is
generally admired by many citizens of his country. He likes to be seen in the tsarist splendor of
the refurbished Kremlin, usually in settings where he is not merely the central but the sole figure.
He eliminates his rivals or perceived enemies often by assassination or poisoning. In war he is
exceptionally brutal and deceptive, as illustrated by the wars against Chechen uprising, Georgian
territorial issues, Syrian conflicts, and by the current ruthless war in Ukraine (e.g., Mariupol,
Bucha, Volnovakha, Borodianka, and Izium). Putin seems untouched by appeals for moderation
and ceasefire or by reports of largescale destruction, civilian deaths, refugees, and forcible
deportation of Ukrainians to Russia, whose fate is unknown for the time being. Brazenly he uses
the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in his efforts to restore the legendary baptism of
Kievan Holy Rus’ and the rebuilding of the Russian Empire at its maximal borders. His first step
is to bring Belarus and Ukraine back into a Great Russian nation. Under the motto Russkiy mir
(Russian world), wherever Russians live should be in union with the Motherland, thus claiming
that many, if not most former Soviet Republics be annexed or otherwise affiliated with the Russian
Federation (with the three Baltic republics and Moldova prioritized in the landgrab.) Next in line
would be former communist countries of Eastern Europe, i.e., Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria, with additional aspirations for Russian spheres of influence on the
Balkans. There have been threats against Finland and Sweden should they join NATO. Obviously
the “great dictator” (if only Charlie Chaplin was still alive!) intends to remake the map of Europe—
again, as he thinks that the United States and its Western allies are too influential. His smokescreen
is that the USA with its NATO allies intend by deception and threat to destroy Russia in a manner
similar to Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union.
These ambitions would be farfetched if Russia did not have nuclear weapons which Putin
openly threatens to use or if he were a normal person to whom catastrophic loss of human life,
including of his own people, mattered. But the above behavioral and character traits shows that
Putin is a deliberately “mysterious” person whose plans are unpredictable (even most Russians
were utterly shocked when he launched the “special military operation”). He displays traits of one
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who suffers from a delusion of grandeur. There are other rulers and even common people who
display delusions of grandeur but rarely are any of them so unrestrained in power and ambition.
His ascent to power was meteoric, and his ambitions are astronomical.
The consequences of these two delusions are tragic even for Russia, and even more so for
Ukraine and other neighbors. There is a potential for a widening global conflict, and ultimately a
real risk of nuclear holocaust. Hopefully, our worst forecasts will not happen; nevertheless, there
is good reason to be anxious about Putin’s bloodthirsty, grandiose plans.

Paul Mojzes, Editor-in-Chief
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